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Introduction
Quantifying working conditions solely on economic indicators, such as pay, can be mis-
leading. This is reflected in the European Union’s ‘more and better jobs’ employment 
strategy and the International Labour Organization’s ‘Decent Work’ campaign (Burchell 
et al., 2014; Dieckhoff and Gallie, 2007; Muñoz de Bustillo et al., 2011). Both are based 
on the idea that satisfying workers’ needs cannot be achieved by providing good pay, 
promotion opportunities and job security alone. Intrinsic job quality also matters. 
However, what constitutes intrinsic job quality relates to long-standing philosophical 
approaches (Green, 2006). While some conceive intrinsic job quality in subjective terms 
by focusing, for example, on job satisfaction, in the past decade most studies have treated 
it as an objective concept, referring to the job characteristics that may, or may not, meet 
people’s needs. Authors in this tradition focus on the work itself and the environment in 
which it is carried out.
The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 
for example, measures intrinsic job quality by focusing on skills use, work intensity, the 
social environment and the physical setting (Eurofound, 2012). The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s ‘quality of the work environment’ 
index is similarly constituted (OECD, 2014: 83–88). We, too, follow this tradition by 
focusing on two of these four components. We do so because skills use is seen as central 
to the enhancement of self-realisation, fulfilment and identity-making at work. High 
work pressure, by contrast, is an important negative aspect of intrinsic job quality, often 
associated with job strain and stress leading to damaging effects on workers’ health and 
well-being (Niedhammer et al., 2014; Warr, 1997). What, then, are the factors which 
make these features of intrinsic job quality better or worse? This is the key overarching 
research question which motivates the article.
We are not alone in this endeavour (e.g. Hoque et al., 2014; Lopes et al., 2015). 
However, it is rare for longitudinal survey data on intrinsic job quality to be collected. Of 
course, some analysts do not use survey data at all, adopting instead a political economy 
approach to identify macro-level forces to explain observed trends. For example, Carré 
et al. (2012) highlight three trends which have worsened job quality: the shift to business 
strategies which emphasise cutting labour costs; the whittling away of labour standards; 
and the increased use of off-shoring. Empirical support for these explanations is taken 
from qualitative case studies of particular economic sectors such as call centres, retailing 
and car production (Álvarez Galván, 2012; Lambert and Henly, 2012; Rothstein, 2012).
Analysts who use survey data, on the other hand, have tended to focus their attention 
on the correlates of particular features of intrinsic job quality such as skills use, training, 
discretion and work intensity. Such analyses are based on cross-sectional techniques 
with occasional use of survey items collecting retrospective data on how particular fea-
tures of work have changed over time. The data sources for this research include inter 
alia the European Working Conditions Survey, the Workplace Employment Relations 
Survey and the Skills and Employment Survey (Felstead et al., 2010; Gallie et al., 2004; 
Green, 2012; van Wanrooy et al., 2013).
The empirical basis of this article is the Skills and Employment Survey 2012 and, 
crucially, a follow-up survey of the same workers interviewed two years later using 
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many of the same questions. This makes the article distinctive in that it examines the 
causal sequence linking changes in independent variables to changes in outcomes. More 
specifically, the article examines the determinants of two key aspects of intrinsic job 
quality, namely skills use at work and work pressure. In this regard, the ability to perform 
a range of tasks, and the ability to do so willingly and without undue pressure are central. 
Intrinsic job quality also includes other features of work which impact on the quality of 
the work environment. These include the anxiety about ill-treatment at work, unease 
about changes to tasks and responsibilities, and the flexibility of jobs to allow workers to 
juggle work and non-work commitments (Burchell et al., 2014). However, given the 
restricted availability of data in the two-wave panel, this article focuses on the determi-
nants of skills use and work pressure. From here on, the term intrinsic job quality is used 
as shorthand for these two particular job features. Nevertheless, this is a limitation which 
future research might address.
Skills use refers to the level of skills required of workers to carry out their jobs, the 
extent to which workers use the skills and abilities they possess, and the extent to 
which workers receive training that develops job-related skills. Work pressure is the 
second aspect of intrinsic job quality examined here. This is measured by the degree to 
which workers voluntarily put more effort into their jobs than is required, the extent to 
which jobs require high levels of work intensity, and the extent to which the job is 
exhausting.
The reminder of the article is structured as follows. The second section outlines exist-
ing literature which suggests causal mechanisms driving up intrinsic job quality as well 
as some driving it down (Autor et al., 2003; Danford et al., 2004; Ramsay et al., 2000; 
Wood et al., 2012). These competing hypotheses draw on debates around the impact of 
greater employee involvement in decisions at work, the organisation of more workers 
into groups who have some control over the work process (i.e. teams) and the replacement 
of labour by digital technology (i.e. computers). The impact of these influences on intrin-
sic job quality is tested using data taken from a two-wave survey of workers carried out 
in 2012 and 2014 in Britain. In the third section, we outline the source of these data in 
more detail, the analytical methods, and the measures used to capture intrinsic job qual-
ity and its determinants. The section also reveals the extent to which intrinsic job quality 
varies over a two-year period. The fourth section uses panel methods to examine how 
three predicted determinants – namely employee involvement, teamworking and com-
puterisation – are correlated with intrinsic job quality. By applying hybrid random effects 
models on the panel data, the article: (1) examines how changes in these factors are 
related to changes in intrinsic job quality; and (2) assesses whether the level of these 
factors is also associated with the level of intrinsic job quality. These are referred to as 
the within-person (or fixed) and between-person effects respectively. The within effects 
results give the change in intrinsic job quality that follows from a change in one of the 
explanatory variables, holding other observed and unobserved factors constant. In addi-
tion, the results allow us to assess whether similar effects are also recorded between-
subjects, hence highlighting the scale of the biases involved in relying on analyses which 
do not control for unobserved heterogeneity. The fifth section concludes the article by 
highlighting the factors policy-makers and practitioners need to promote in order to raise 
intrinsic job quality as well as factors which can be beneficial in some respects but 
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harmful in others. It also outlines a future research agenda based on the limitations of the 
present study.
Existing literature and hypotheses
The idea that effective human resource management practices can impact positively on 
the bottom line has attracted much attention (Boxall and Winterton, 2015). This ‘High 
Involvement Management’ (HIM) approach requires a shift from production systems 
based on hierarchical forms of control to systems that empower workers to participate 
in decision-making and encourage them to work with their peers. It is characterised by 
two conceptually distinct forms of employee involvement. First, there is role-based 
involvement. This focuses on the employee’s primary job tasks and responsibilities, and 
the extent to which these can be determined by the employee. Organisational involve-
ment is the second aspect. This entails workers participating in decision-making beyond 
the confines of the job and includes decisions about how the organisation is run (Wood 
et al., 2012).
From a managerial point of view, the aim of involving employees more in both of 
these ways is to draw on their creative abilities, and hence increase business perfor-
mance. On this basis, we hypothesise that greater employee involvement in the job and 
organisational decision-making will be associated with an increase in the skills used at 
work, a closer match between employees’ skills and those used in the job, and an increase 
in the provision of skills-enhancing training (Hypothesis 1).
Advocates of this paradigm make the additional argument that giving employees the 
opportunity to participate in substantive shopfloor and organisational level decisions 
incentivises them to put in extra effort beyond what is required (Appelbaum et al., 2000: 
25–46). Such productive systems draw on ‘the latent knowledge of workers to reduce 
waste, to solve problems more quickly, and to balance the workload and regulate the 
production process’ (2000: 229). In other words, employees are incentivised to work 
both smarter and harder, not because they have to, but because they are willing to do so 
– going the extra mile to make the organisation succeed by expending greater ‘discre-
tionary effort’. The optimistic hypothesis, then, is that HIM-style practices will be associ-
ated with higher levels of discretionary effort (Hypothesis 2).
However, labour process theorists offer counter-arguments. They suggest the effects 
on workers are negative (e.g. Harley, 1999; Ramsay et al., 2000). Such theorists base 
their analyses on the argument that there is a systematic trend in capitalism towards the 
intensification of work, whereby managers are driven to find new ways of making 
employees work harder. Viewed from this perspective, HIM provides employers with 
another way of intensifying labour, while pretending to empower workers. Labour pro-
cess theory, then, predicts that HIM will have a detrimental impact on the worker experi-
ence with business gains coming ‘at the expense of stress, work intensification and job 
strain’ (Ramsay et al., 2000: 505). We therefore examine the determinants of required 
effort and work exhaustion to test the pessimistic hypothesis that HIM practices will 
raise both required effort and levels of work exhaustion (Hypothesis 3).
The use of teams is often taken to be a key component of HIM since it is argued they 
give employees a further opportunity to use their knowledge, skills and abilities beyond 
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the confines of their own job to improve the performance of peers. Teams are defined as 
a group of employees ‘who meet with some regularity in order to work interdependently 
on fulfilling a specific task’ (Mueller et al., 2000: 1398–1399). It is further recognised 
that a team’s responsibilities can vary in scope and degree. Advocates of HIM argue that 
stronger teams will act to raise skill levels, make more effective use of workers’ skills, 
encourage employers to provide skills development training and make employees more 
willing to exercise discretionary effort (Hypothesis 4).
On the other hand, labour process theory suggests that performance gains come 
through enforced increases in effort and higher levels of work fatigue. This is because 
the use of teamworking represents a change in the means by which employers exercise 
control and not its negation (Edwards et al., 2002). Case study research, for example, 
demonstrates how teamworking can shift, at least some, surveillance roles from manag-
ers to co-workers, and that performance gains can be achieved through peer pressure 
(Baldry et al., 1998; Danford et al., 2004). Through this horizontal disciplinary gaze, 
team members are made aware of each other’s mistakes and performance levels, and are 
expected to identify, aid and ultimately sanction those who jeopardise the team’s perfor-
mance (Bain and Taylor, 2000; Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992). We, therefore, test the 
pessimistic hypothesis that stronger teams raise levels of enforced effort and exhaustion 
(Hypothesis 5).
The impact that technological change has on the skill level of jobs has attracted the 
attention of social science scholars for many years. Much of the early interest was 
prompted by Braverman (1974), who argued that technological change was not neutral 
in its effects or in its design, but instead was used to remove ‘brain work’ from the shop-
floor, relocate analysis of the work process to management, and instruct workers what is 
to be done, how and at what speed.
However, there is a competing school of thought which suggests that technological 
change requires the completion of more complex work tasks, hence pushing skill levels 
upwards (Blauner, 1964; Kerr et al., 1960). This perspective has received recent support 
from the theory of skills-biased technological change (SBTC). Early versions of the the-
ory suggested that computerisation – that is, the process of replacing human labour with 
machines which perform ‘tasks that are deterministically specified by stored instructions 
… such as binary numbers’ (Autor et al., 2003: 1282) – is more effectively used by better 
educated workers, hence raising both their relative productivity and wages (Goos and 
Manning, 2007).
Initially, computers were only used by the most educated, but as the technology has 
matured they have been seamlessly incorporated into many devices. A more nuanced 
view of SBTC has therefore evolved. Rather than examining its impact on whole job 
types such as scientists and technicians, this approach suggests that information and 
communication technology (ICT) has a subtler impact on many jobs. It does so by a 
process of limited substitution whereby tasks which ‘can be accomplished by machines 
following explicit programmed rules’ are computerised, while tasks which are ‘not suf-
ficiently well understood to be specified in a computer code and executed by a machine’ 
remain in human hands (Autor et al., 2003: 1283).
Faced with the falling price and rising power of computing capital, employers have 
responded by changing the task mix of jobs towards non-programmable tasks which only 
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human labour can carry out, thereby driving average skill levels upwards. Based on this 
theory, then, we would expect increased levels of computer use – at the level of the job or 
the workplace – to be associated with increased skill levels exercised at work, better use 
of available knowledge and abilities, and an increased emphasis on skills development 
training (Hypothesis 6).
The effects of computers on intrinsic job quality are not, however, confined to skills. 
This is highlighted by the theory of effort-biased technological change (EBTC). 
According to this, ICT provides the opportunity to intensify work during the working 
day – raising its pace, minimising the gaps between work tasks and facilitating the exten-
sion of work activity beyond the conventional workplace (Felstead et al., 2005; Green, 
2004). This opportunity could be taken up voluntarily or required by employers; either 
way, whether through choice or obligation, the result is work intensification. According 
to EBTC, then, both sources of work intensification are likely to be triggered by ICT.
The same outcome – work intensification – is predicted by labour process theory, but 
it is expected to come from ramping up required effort. The argument derives from the 
surveillance potential of computerisation and its controlling capabilities (Bain and 
Taylor, 2000; Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992). For these theorists, computers represent the 
electronic panopticon, the modern-day version of the architectural device used for the 
design of prisons in the mid-eighteenth century and subsequently used by Foucault 
(1977) as a metaphor for social surveillance. Furthermore, computerisation of the whole 
workplace allows performance levels of individual workers to be compared across as 
well as between departments and allows management to identify areas of slack in the 
organisation of labour.
Whether from the perspective of EBTC or from that of labour process theory, we 
would therefore predict that computerisation is associated with increased required effort 
levels and a rise in the work exhaustion rate; from the perspective of EBTC, there would 
also be a rise in discretionary effort (Hypothesis 7).
Data, analytical approach and measures
Data
The unique feature of this article is that it is based on a follow-up of workers interviewed 
for the Skills and Employment Survey 2012 (Felstead et al., 2015b). The original cross-
sectional survey comprises 2782 interviews with workers aged 20–65. A total 1108 of the 
2497 respondents from 2012, who were willing to be re-contacted, were re-interviewed 
using around half of the questions they were asked in 2012. Not all of those in the origi-
nal sample were targeted for re-interview due to funding constraints. Nevertheless, 44% 
of those willing to be re-interviewed took part, with 95% being re-interviewed within 
two months of the second anniversary of their 2012 interview. The response rate to the 
2012 survey was 49%, while it was 71% in the follow-up. Weights were constructed in 
order to correct for biases in the original selection into the 2012 survey. The panel 
weights also took into account sample attrition between waves and are used where speci-
fied. The results are based on 908 respondents who were employees in both surveys 
(or 1816 employee-years), with sample sizes falling where there are missing values. 
A profile of the weighted sample is shown in Table 1.
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Analytical approach
Most previous studies (e.g. Felstead and Gallie, 2004; Green et al., 2001) have used 
cross-sectional data to examine the correlates of intrinsic job quality. A set of standard 
controls – such as sex, age, occupation and industry – which might also act as correlates 
of intrinsic job quality are entered into a series of regression models along with a set of 
explanatory variables. The aim is to isolate the associations of interest and test whether 
they are significantly related to the outcome variables ceteris paribus. However, this 
approach can only control for characteristics observed in the data. Cross-sectional analy-
sis is therefore open to the criticism that there may be omitted characteristics which vary 
between individuals and confound the associations of interest. Hence, the resulting esti-
mates may be biased. We avoid this problem by running a series of hybrid random effects 
models with robust standard errors on panel data.
Each individual in the data has two sets of records, one relating to the responses they 
gave in 2012 and another relating to responses given in 2014. In these circumstances, the 
use of either random effects (RE) or fixed effects (FE) models is the recommended 
approach (Firebaugh et al., 2013). However, both have strengths and weaknesses. The 
RE approach estimates the effect of time-invariant characteristics (such as sex) and time-
varying features (such as greater employee involvement) on measures of job quality as 
reported by respondents in 2012 and 2014. The resulting estimations are based on two 
sources of variation: that occurring between people and that occurring within people at 
two time points.
Table 1. Profile of respondents.
Characteristica Percentage
Sex  
 Male 50.2
 Female 49.8
Age in 2012  
 20–35 31.7
 36–49 37.1
 50–59 22.9
 60–65 8.3
Industrial sector in 2012  
 Manufacturing, extractive and construction 16.9
 Other industries 83.1
Hours of work in 2012  
 Full-time 74.8
 Part-time 25.2
Employment change, 2012–2014  
 Same job, same employer 77.4
 Same job, different employer 15.6
 Different job, same employer 6.9
 Number of employee year observations 1816
aThese results are weighted.
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By contrast, the coefficients produced by FE models are based solely on within-per-
son variation, hence controlling for attitudinal and other unknown time-invariant differ-
ences between individuals. However, by focusing exclusively on within-person changes, 
FE models drop information on between-person variation and the explanatory value this 
may shed on the factors associated with higher or lower levels of job quality. In this arti-
cle, we are interested in both; that is, those which may trigger moves up or down in job 
quality (i.e. within-person or fixed effects) as well as general differences between indi-
viduals that may be associated with higher or lower job quality (i.e. between-person 
effects).
Given these requirements, the recommended approach is to use hybrid random effect 
models (Allison, 2009). As in the FE model, time-varying independent variables are 
transformed into deviations from their person-specific means, but unlike the FE model 
the variable to be explained is not transformed in this way. In another departure, time-
invariant variables are also included in the model along with the person-specific means 
for each of the time-varying variables. Such variables include controls which may also 
be associated with intrinsic job quality (see Table A1). These variables are: sex, age, 
hours of work, permanency, job tenure, occupation, industry and personality (since even 
objective reporting of features of the job may be influenced by the respondent’s 
outlook).
The hybrid model produces a set of ‘within’ and ‘between’ coefficients. By comparing 
these estimates we reveal what further insights controlling for time-constant unobserved 
heterogeneity (within-subject effects) can add to techniques which focus on between-
subject effects, such as traditional cross-sectional analysis. However, one limitation of 
the model is that it does not eliminate completely the confounding effects of unobserved 
heterogeneity since it does not take into account unobserved time-varying items which 
may be correlated with the changes observed in the data. Having said that, repeating the 
analysis on different samples (such as those who neither changed job nor employer) sug-
gests that a more complete model would confirm the findings reported below.
Measures
The article focuses on skills use and work pressure as two distinct aspects of intrinsic job 
quality, each measured by three indicators (see Table A2). The level of job skills required 
is our first measure and is derived from importance ratings given by respondents to 16 
work activities. Our second measure focuses on the fit between job skills and workers’ 
own skills. Employers can also play an active role in developing employee skills through 
training. We therefore devise a skills development training indicator to capture the extent 
to which employer-provided training enhances skills for the job. This is our third meas-
ure of skills use and is based on four questions asked of training recipients.
The two-wave panel allows us to model how skills use varies between as well as 
within employees. Not surprisingly, the between-subject variation in the data is higher 
than the variation found within subjects. For example, the variation in exposure to skills 
development training experienced by an employee between 2012 and 2014 is about two-
thirds of the variation between employees (see footnotes to Tables 2, panel a–c). That is, 
if two employees were to be randomly drawn from our panel data, the difference in the 
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skills development training index would be one and a half times higher than the change 
a single employee is likely to experience over two years.
The use of transition matrices also demonstrates the scale of these movements. For 
two of our skills use measures we use quantile cut-points taken from the index scores for 
required job skills and skills development training for 2012 and 2014 to produce ‘low’, 
‘medium’ and ‘high’ rankings. To ensure that each of the three cells has a reasonable 
Table 2. Intrinsic job quality transition matrices: skills use.
(a) Required job skills 2014 Total 
 Percentage  
 Low Medium High
2012 Percentage Low 70.9 24.9 4.2 100
Medium 23.0 50.5 26.5 100
High 6.0 24.1 69.9 100
Total 31.8 32.8 35.4 100
N = 1816
Standard deviation: 0.562 (between-subject); 0.232 (within-subject).
(b) Skills utilisation 2014  Total
 Percentage  
 Low Medium High
2012 Percentage Low 39.5 38.7 21.9 100
Medium 8.2 57.0 34.9 100
High 3.0 30.8 66.2 100
Total 10.2 43.9 46.0 100
N = 1813
Standard deviation: 0.618 (between-subject); 0.396 (within-subject).
(c) Skills development 
training
2014 Total 
 Percentage  
 Low Medium High
2012 Percentage Low 57.3 25.8 16.9 100
Medium 23.0 40.0 37.0 100
High 11.9 33.1 55.0 100
Total 29.0 33.6 37.4 100
N = 1814
Standard deviation: 0.275 (between-subject); 0.172 (within-subject).
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number of observations for our single question indicator, we categorise the two disagree 
statements as ‘low’, and ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ as ‘medium’ and ‘high’ respectively. 
Table 2 shows how employees in the panel shifted between these categories. As the lead-
ing diagonal demonstrates, most employees remained in the same category between 
2012 and 2014. However, movements up and down the rankings were not uncommon. 
For example, around a quarter of those in jobs demanding ‘medium’ skills in 2012 were 
in jobs demanding ‘low’ skills in 2014, while a similar proportion moved in the opposite 
direction. The results also suggest an overall upward movement in effective skills use 
and skills development training with proportionately more of those in jobs demanding 
‘low’ skills in 2012 moving to the ‘high’ skills category in 2014 than vice versa.
Work pressure is the second aspect of intrinsic job quality focused on here. We distin-
guish two types of effort: that which is discretionary and that which is a requirement of 
the job. A single survey item is used to indicate the former. Respondents were asked how 
strongly they agreed or disagreed that they were ‘willing to work harder than I have to in 
order to help this organisation succeed’. Required work effort, on the other hand, is a 
composite indicator derived from four separate survey questions on hard work, tension 
levels, the pace of work and working to tight deadlines. Our third indicator of work pres-
sure is based on respondents’ self-reports of the consequences of work for their physical 
and mental well-being. While these responses include a subjective assessment, they pro-
vide the best available measure in the data.
Since we have panel data we can decompose the average values of these three indica-
tors into between-subject and within-subject variation. This analysis shows that the 
standard deviation of the latter is between half and two-thirds of the former. In other 
words, work pressure varies – not surprisingly – to a greater extent between employees 
than it does for an individual employee over a two-year period. Nevertheless, the transi-
tion matrices also show that a large minority of individual employees experience upward 
and downward movement in the pressures under which they work. These matrices are 
constructed as follows. In the case of discretionary effort, we collapse the four-way 
agreement scale into three. To ensure, as far as possible, reasonable cell sizes we catego-
rise the two disagree statements as ‘low’, the ‘agree’ statement as ‘medium’ and the 
‘strongly agree’ response as ‘high’. For the work exhaustion question, we take ‘hardly 
ever/never’ to be ‘low’, ‘sometimes’ to be ‘medium’ and ‘always/often’ to be ‘high’ – 
again, to ensure reasonable cell sizes. Finally, quantile cut-points are used to divide the 
required effort index for the 2012 and 2014 samples into three. The results show that 
many employees are positioned on the leading diagonals of Table 3 panels a–c – suggest-
ing little change in the level of pressure under which they work. However, there are size-
able proportions of employees registered in off-diagonal positions which suggests that 
working life is deteriorating for some while improving for others, with the transitional 
matrices suggesting a downward bias (note the greater proportion of ‘low’ pressure 
workers in 2012 moving to ‘high’ pressure positions in 2014 than vice versa). This article 
examines explanations for these patterns.
One of these explanations focuses on the role played by employee involvement, 
which is captured in four ways. First, we measure the extent to which employees exer-
cise discretion over the tasks to be done, how they are to be done, to what standards and 
with what effort. Our second indicator of employee involvement takes data from a 
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question which asks respondents whether they would have a say in decisions taken 
which might affect their work and if so what level of influence they might have. Thirdly, 
we construct an employee consultation measure by counting the number of issues over 
which employees are consulted. Fourthly, respondents were asked whether over the last 
year they had made one or more suggestions to management ‘about the ways of improv-
ing the efficiency with which work is carried out’. However, it must be pointed out that 
Table 3. Intrinsic job quality transition matrices: work pressure.
(a) Discretionary 
effort
2014 Total
 Percentage  
 Low Medium High
2012 Percentage Low 44.5 45.4 10.1 100
Medium 10.9 64.0 25.1 100
High  5.1 34.3 60.6 100
Total 13.8 53.0 33.3 100
N = 1795
Standard deviation: 0.633 (between-subject); 0.335 (within-subject).
(b) Required 
effort
2014 Total
 Percentage  
 Low Medium High
2012 Percentage Low 56.9 28.4 14.7 100
Medium 23.8 39.8 36.5 100
High  9.0 30.8 60.2 100
Total 30.7 32.9 36.3 100
N = 1816
Standard deviation: 0.587 (between-subject); 0.373 (within-subject).
(c) Work 
exhaustion
2014 Total
 Percentage  
 Low Medium High
2012 Percentage Low 49.0 36.4 14.6 100
Medium 14.4 60.7 24.9 100
High  4.0 26.5 69.5 100
Total 15.3 40.7 44.0 100
N = 1815
Standard deviation: 0.894 (between-subject); 0.487 (within-subject).
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HIM comprises other features, such as performance-related pay, which are not available 
in the data.
Teamworking is also regarded as a possible trigger for movements in intrinsic job 
quality. In accordance with the conceptualisation of teams (e.g. Mueller et al., 2000) we 
categorise teams according to the degree to which they influence how tasks are carried 
out by team members and how the team is managed (Gallie et al., 2012). The resulting 
indicator varies according to the level of control teams are able to exercise.
The literature further suggests that the process of replacing human labour with digi-
tally programmable machines (i.e. computerisation) plays an important role in determin-
ing the direction and scale of changes to intrinsic job quality. Respondents were asked 
about the level of workplace computerisation, and the extent and sophistication of their 
own computer use on the job. Two indicators of computerisation are therefore used in the 
analysis which follows.
Testing the hypotheses and making an empirical 
contribution
Skills use
Hypothesis 1 is that greater employee involvement will be associated with an increase in 
skills use as indicated by a rise in skill levels, a closer match between employees’ skills 
and those used in the job, and an increase in the provision of skills-enhancing training. 
Previous research (e.g. Boxall and Macky, 2014; Felstead and Gallie, 2004; Green et al., 
2001) based on cross-sectional data supports this hypothesis. However, we go further by 
tracking how the responses given by the same employees – whose characteristics and 
attitudes are largely time invariant – change over a two-year period.
The results produced are confirmatory. All four indicators of employee involvement – 
changes in discretion levels, the extent of consultation, involvement in job changing 
decisions and the frequency with which employees make suggestions to management – 
are positively and significantly related to changes in the level of job skills. Thus, a rise in 
employee involvement induces a rise in skill levels and vice versa. The between-subject 
coefficients are also, in the main, positive, statistically significant and of similar magni-
tude to the within-subject coefficients. Taken together, these results suggest that higher 
levels of employee involvement promote higher job skills and vice versa. Furthermore, 
unobserved heterogeneity does not appear to bias the cross-sectional results since the 
coefficients for the within- and between-effects models are of similar magnitude and are 
not significantly different (columns 1 and 2, Table 4).
The results for effective skills use and skills development training follow a similar 
pattern. The between-effects coefficients suggest that members of the panel whose 
involvement levels are, on average, higher report better skills utilisation and better skills 
development training (columns 3 and 5, Table 4). Furthermore, the within-effects coef-
ficients suggest that an increase (decrease) in employee involvement triggers greater 
(lesser) skills utilisation and skills development training according to two out of four 
involvement measures (columns 4 and 6, Table 4). Overall, the within-effects estimates 
confirm previous estimates from cross-sectional analyses and are not significantly differ-
ent from the between-effects estimates in the models presented here.
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The effect of teamworking is, however, not as strong. While it is has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the level of jobs skills required of employees in both the 
panel estimates, it fails to have an impact on the other two measures of skills demand – 
skills utilisation and skills development training (columns 1 and 2, Table 3). This sug-
gests that greater use of teamworking induces an increase in job skills and that this 
pattern is repeated between employees exposed to different levels of teamworking. These 
findings are in line with advocates of HIM who argue that organising work in this way 
promotes upskilling as outlined in Hypothesis 4, but better (or worse) skills utilisation 
and skills development training appear unrelated to team strength.
The results for proponents of skills-biased technological change are, on the other 
hand, a little stronger. An increase in either computerisation of the job or the workplace 
triggers a statistically significant rise in job skill requirements, with the between-subject 
effects similarly positive, if not always significant (columns 1 and 2, Table 4). Greater 
skills development training, however, is prompted by a rise in computerisation of the job, 
but a higher level of computerisation between panel members is not associated with bet-
ter skills training (columns 5 and 6, Table 4). There is, therefore, reasonably strong – but 
not universal – evidence of skills-biased technological change in the panel data provid-
ing confirmation for Hypothesis 6.
Work pressure
The debate around the effect of employee involvement, teamworking and computerisa-
tion on the level and change on work pressure has generated much controversy. The 
crucial issue is whether increased effort levels are discretionary or enforced and whether 
employees feel more or less exhausted as a result. This is reflected in the hypotheses 
outlined earlier.
Advocates of HIM claim that some of its performance gains come from a greater 
willingness of employees to work harder by putting in extra effort beyond what is for-
mally required (Appelbaum et al., 2000: 25–46). The panel data suggest that changes in 
two of these indicators – discretion over day-to-day tasks and direct involvement in 
organisational decisions affecting the job – trigger movements up and down in discre-
tionary effort and therefore support Hypothesis 2. Furthermore, within- and between-
effects are, again similar, thereby suggesting that an analysis based on a cross-sectional 
version of the data is prone to minimal bias (columns 1 and 2, Table 5).
The evidence that HIM raises or reduces required effort levels, on the other hand, is 
not that strong either way. Most of the coefficients in the models are not significant and 
where they are, they are neither wholly positive nor negative. This is contrary to labour 
process predictions that HIM will lead to enforced work intensification as outlined in 
Hypothesis 3.
In fact, we find a little more support for the optimistic HIM position that employee 
involvement dampens levels of work exhaustion. In the within-subject part of the hybrid 
model, three out of four of the employee involvement indicators are negatively related to 
work exhaustion with one being statistically significant (column 6, Table 5). This weakens 
the pessimistic predictions of labour process theorists that HIM is a means of sweating 
labour (e.g. Ramsay et al., 2000). Furthermore, a comparison of the two types of estimates 
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suggests that the inability of between-subject models to counter the problem of unobserved 
heterogeneity may produce biased and therefore misleading results. One interpretation of 
these results, then, is that HIM prompts different types of effort to move in different direc-
tions. Required effort is pushed downwards while discretionary effort is pushed upwards, 
and with the changing source of pressure reported levels of work exhaustion fall.
Teamworking, too, divides academic opinion. On the one hand, some predict that 
teamworking enhances employees’ willingness to contribute to the collective effort 
(Hypothesis 4). On the other hand, there are those who suggest that the horizontal gaze 
of peers is another means of intensifying work (Hypothesis 5). There is a modicum of 
support for this position in the data. For example, a rise in the influence teams have over 
day-to-day tasks and management functions does trigger an increase in required effort 
(columns 3 and 4, Table 5). However, stronger work teams do not trigger a rise in work 
exhaustion and so Hypothesis 5 is only partly supported by the evidence.
By contrast, there is less disagreement among theorists on the predicted effects of 
technology on work intensity, and the findings are consistent with both EBTC and labour 
process theory. An increase in computerisation of the job is significantly associated with 
a rise in required work effort, while an increase in the extent of workplace computerisa-
tion triggers a rise in work exhaustion (columns 4 and 6, Table 5). These findings support 
Hypothesis 7. In addition, an increase in the extent of workplace computerisation is also 
associated with a rise in discretionary effort – in line with the specific and additional 
prediction of EBTC.
Conclusion
Despite the importance attached to securing ‘better jobs’ by policy-makers, such as the 
EU and the ILO, survey research has been unable to make definite statements about what 
factors lead to and cause upward and downward movements in intrinsic job quality. The 
root of this difficulty is the cross-sectional evidence base on which previous research is 
based. Statements regarding causality cannot be made using this type of data since unob-
served characteristics between respondents may be driving correlations in observed out-
comes. However, this article breaks new ground by presenting evidence drawn from a 
two-wave panel of workers interviewed in 2012 and then again in 2014. By focusing on 
how the working lives of individual employees change over this period as well as those 
for whom there is little change, the article largely overcomes this problem. The article, 
therefore, identifies factors which trigger rises and falls in the level of skills used and 
developed at work, and the pressures under which that work is carried out, and so pro-
vides a causal account of change.
The results of the paper are three-fold. First, while most of employees in the panel 
experienced little change in the skills they used at work or in the pressure under which 
they laboured, sizeable minorities experienced a worsening or an improvement in these 
conditions. In fact, if anything, there was a tendency for skills to improve and work pres-
sure to rise over the two-year period. Were the time period between interviews longer, 
these changes may have been even more dramatic. Nevertheless, the findings suggest 
that many employees experience changes in the intrinsic quality of their jobs even over 
a relatively short period.
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Second, the findings point to a number of causal explanations which have been high-
lighted by the literature. The introduction of HIM, for example, raises and develops the 
skill levels exercised by employees, but not at the cost of enforced work intensification. 
Instead, HIM increases employees’ willingness to go the extra mile, while also dampen-
ing levels of work exhaustion. The implication here is that employers who tap into work-
ers’ creativity are rewarded with greater effort, elicited not by force but by consent. 
Moreover, HIM also lessens over-exertion which can lead to ill-health and costs for both 
workers and employers. However, the impact of increased use of teamworking and com-
puterisation for intrinsic job quality is less clear-cut. While both prompt an upward 
movement in the abilities needed at work, this comes at the cost of increased enforced 
work effort. In the case of computerisation, there is evidence that both levels of discre-
tionary effort and work exhaustion are also raised. This suggests that the effect of team-
working and computerisation on skills use and work pressure is two-faced. One 
interpretation is that to operate in a team and work with more sophisticated equipment 
requires workers with higher abilities, but both also serve to enhance levels of surveil-
lance by employers and/or fellow workers.
Third, despite justifiable concerns that unobserved heterogeneity may confound the 
associations found in traditional cross-sectional analyses, our random effects estimates 
are broadly in line with those from the fixed effects models. This provides some reassur-
ance that existing cross-sectional analyses may not be as suspect as feared. However, 
replication of this study will be needed to provide further confirmation.
Such future research will also need to address some of the current study’s drawbacks. 
The measures of intrinsic job quality are, for example, limited. Despite the multi-faceted 
nature of the concept, this article only examines skills use and work pressure, and does 
not cover issues such as the scheduling and location of work which are central to the 
work–life balance debate. Similarly, the article operationalises HIM using a limited set 
of indicators. In addition, improvements could be made to the design of similar panel 
studies in the future. This would include lengthening the gap between panel interviews 
and re-interviewing panellists on multiple occasions.
Despite these drawbacks the results underline the economic case for getting indi-
vidual employees more involved in decisions about their jobs and the wider function-
ing of the organisation. They support the interest taken by policy-makers in the 
promotion and support of HIM (Belt and Giles, 2009). The results also reinforce the 
policy recommendation that direct intervention is needed to enhance employee voice. 
The 2002 EU Information and Consultation of Employees (ICE) directive, for exam-
ple, was weakly translated into UK law, hence many of the original directive’s features 
were diluted (Dundon et al., 2014; Felstead et al., 2015a). The findings presented here 
suggest that an economic case can be made for greater employee involvement and that 
on this basis UK law needs strengthening. In addition, the results provide further evi-
dence to employers of the business benefits of increasing employee involvement given 
that it elicits more from employees (Preenen et al., 2015). However, teamworking and 
computerisation need to be introduced with a view to mitigating some of the negative 
consequences. In particular, the intensifying aspects of both developments need to be 
tamed if their overall impact on intrinsic job quality is to be beneficial to both employ-
ees and employers.
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Table A1. Control variables.
Control variables Description
Sex 0/1: male/female
Age Continuous and squared
Hours of work 0/1: full-time/part-time
Temporary work 0/1: permanent/temporary
Job tenure Log of continuous variable in years, with job tenure of movers 
assumed to be one year
Occupation 8 dummies based on the Standard Occupational Classification: 
managers; professionals; associate professionals; administrative; 
skilled trades; caring and leisure; sales; plant operative; elementary
Industry 18 dummies based on the Standard Industrial Classification system: 
agriculture; mining; manufacturing; electricity; construction; 
wholesale; transport; accommodation; communication; finance; real 
estate; scientific; administrative; public administration; education; 
health; arts; other services; household services
Region 10 dummies based on the regions of Britain: North East; North 
West; Yorkshire; East Midlands; West Midlands; East of England; 
London; South East; South West; Wales; Scotland
Personality 5 personality traits each measured by two descriptors (one positive, 
one negative) on a five-point agreement scale
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n 
m
ad
e.
(b
) T
ea
m
w
or
ki
ng
T
yp
es
 o
f t
ea
m
 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 
in
flu
en
ce
 o
ve
r 
da
y-
to
-d
ay
 
ta
sk
s 
an
d 
gr
ou
p 
m
an
ag
em
en
t
‘D
o 
yo
u 
us
ua
lly
 w
or
k 
on
 o
ur
 o
w
n 
or
 d
oe
s 
yo
ur
 w
or
k 
in
vo
lv
e 
w
or
ki
ng
 t
og
et
he
r 
as
 a
 g
ro
up
 w
ith
 o
ne
 o
f m
or
e 
ot
he
r 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
in
 a
 s
im
ila
r 
po
si
tio
n 
to
 y
ou
rs
?’ 
If 
so
, r
es
po
nd
en
ts
 
w
er
e 
as
ke
d 
ab
ou
t 
th
e 
te
am
’s
 in
flu
en
ce
 o
ve
r:
 h
ow
 h
ar
d 
th
ey
 
w
or
ke
d,
 d
ec
id
in
g 
w
ha
t 
ta
sk
s 
th
ey
 c
ou
ld
 d
o,
 d
ec
id
in
g 
ho
w
 
th
ey
 w
er
e 
to
 d
o 
th
e 
ta
sk
 a
nd
 d
ec
id
in
g 
th
e 
qu
al
ity
 s
ta
nd
ar
ds
 t
o 
w
hi
ch
 t
he
y 
w
or
ke
d.
 R
es
po
nd
en
ts
 w
er
e 
al
so
 a
sk
ed
 a
bo
ut
 t
he
 
in
flu
en
ce
 t
he
 t
ea
m
 h
ad
 o
ve
r:
 s
et
tin
g 
ta
rg
et
s,
 s
el
ec
tin
g 
te
am
 
m
em
be
rs
 a
nd
 c
ho
os
in
g 
te
am
 le
ad
er
s.
 T
ho
se
 w
ho
 w
or
ke
d 
in
 
te
am
s 
w
hi
ch
 h
ad
 ‘a
 g
re
at
 d
ea
l’ 
or
 ‘a
 fa
ir
 a
m
ou
nt
’ o
f i
nf
lu
en
ce
 
on
 a
ll 
se
ve
n 
as
pe
ct
s 
ar
e 
cl
as
si
fie
d 
as
 s
el
f-m
an
ag
in
g 
te
am
s.
 
T
ho
se
 w
ho
 r
ep
or
te
d 
ha
vi
ng
 ‘a
 g
re
at
 d
ea
l’ 
or
 ‘a
 fa
ir
 a
m
ou
nt
’ 
of
 in
flu
en
ce
 o
ve
r 
da
y-
to
-d
ay
 t
as
ks
 b
ut
 n
ot
 o
ve
r 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
ta
sk
s 
ar
e 
cl
as
si
fie
d 
as
 s
em
i-a
ut
on
om
ou
s 
te
am
s,
 w
hi
le
 t
ho
se
 
w
ho
 w
or
k 
in
 t
ea
m
s 
w
ith
 le
ss
 in
flu
en
ce
 o
ve
r 
th
e 
se
ve
n 
ar
ea
s 
ar
e 
ca
te
go
ri
se
d 
as
 n
on
-s
el
f-d
ir
ec
tin
g 
te
am
s.
 L
as
tly
, t
he
re
 a
re
 
th
os
e 
w
ho
 d
o 
no
t 
w
or
k 
in
 a
 t
ea
m
.
T
he
 t
ea
m
w
or
ki
ng
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
de
sc
en
ds
 fr
om
 3
 t
o 
0 
ac
co
rd
in
gl
y.
T
ab
le
 A
2.
 (
C
on
tin
ue
d)
 at University College London on October 26, 2016eid.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Felstead et al. 25
M
ea
su
re
Su
rv
ey
 q
ue
st
io
n
R
es
po
ns
e 
sc
al
e 
an
d 
ca
lib
ra
tio
n
(c
) C
om
pu
te
ris
at
io
n
Ex
te
nt
 o
f 
co
m
pu
te
r 
us
e 
in
 
th
e 
w
or
kp
la
ce
 a
s 
a 
w
ho
le
‘In
 y
ou
r 
w
or
kp
la
ce
, w
ha
t 
pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
w
or
k 
w
ith
 
co
m
pu
te
ri
se
d 
or
 a
ut
om
at
ed
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t?
’
R
es
po
nd
en
ts
 w
er
e 
gi
ve
n 
fiv
e 
op
tio
ns
: ‘
m
or
e 
th
an
 t
hr
ee
-
qu
ar
te
rs
’; 
‘h
al
f t
o 
th
re
e-
qu
ar
te
rs
’; 
‘a
bo
ut
 h
al
f’;
 ‘a
 q
ua
rt
er
 
to
 h
al
f’;
 ‘l
es
s 
th
an
 a
 q
ua
rt
er
’; 
an
d 
‘n
on
e’
 (
4–
0)
.
Im
po
rt
an
ce
 o
f 
co
m
pu
te
rs
 t
o 
th
e 
jo
b 
an
d 
th
e 
co
m
pl
ex
ity
 o
f 
th
ei
r 
us
e
R
es
po
nd
en
ts
 w
er
e 
as
ke
d,
 in
 y
ou
r 
jo
b 
ho
w
 im
po
rt
an
t 
is
 
‘u
si
ng
 a
 c
om
pu
te
r,
 ‘P
C
’, 
or
 o
th
er
 t
yp
es
 o
f c
om
pu
te
ri
se
d 
eq
ui
pm
en
t?
’ C
om
pu
te
r 
us
er
s 
w
er
e 
al
so
 a
sk
ed
: ‘
W
hi
ch
 o
f t
he
 
w
or
ds
 in
 C
A
PI
T
A
LS
 b
es
t 
de
sc
ri
be
s 
yo
ur
 u
se
 o
f c
om
pu
te
rs
 o
r 
co
m
pu
te
ri
se
d 
eq
ui
pm
en
t 
in
 y
ou
r 
jo
b?
’
R
es
po
nd
en
ts
 w
er
e 
gi
ve
n 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
ra
tin
g 
sc
al
e:
 
‘e
ss
en
tia
l’;
 ‘v
er
y 
im
po
rt
an
t’;
 ‘f
ai
rl
y 
im
po
rt
an
t’;
 ‘n
ot
 v
er
y 
im
po
rt
an
t’;
 o
r 
‘n
ot
 a
t 
al
l i
m
po
rt
an
t/
do
es
 n
ot
 a
pp
ly
’. 
C
om
pu
te
r 
us
er
s 
w
er
e 
th
en
 a
sk
ed
 t
o 
cl
as
si
fy
 t
he
ir
 u
se
 a
s:
 
‘S
T
R
A
IG
H
T
FO
R
W
A
R
D
 (
fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e,
 u
si
ng
 a
 c
om
pu
te
r 
fo
r 
st
ra
ig
ht
fo
rw
ar
d 
ro
ut
in
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 s
uc
h 
as
 p
ri
nt
in
g 
ou
t 
an
 in
vo
ic
e 
in
 a
 s
ho
p)
’;
‘M
O
D
ER
A
T
E 
(fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e,
 u
si
ng
 a
 c
om
pu
te
r 
fo
r 
w
or
d-
pr
oc
es
si
ng
 a
nd
/o
r 
sp
re
ad
sh
ee
ts
 o
r 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
in
g 
w
ith
 
ot
he
rs
 b
y 
‘e
m
ai
l’)
’;
‘C
O
M
PL
EX
 (
fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e,
 u
si
ng
 a
 c
om
pu
te
r 
fo
r 
an
al
ys
in
g 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
or
 d
es
ig
n,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
us
e 
of
 c
om
pu
te
r 
ai
de
d 
de
si
gn
 o
r 
st
at
is
tic
al
 a
na
ly
si
s 
pa
ck
ag
es
)’;
‘A
D
V
A
N
C
ED
 (
fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e,
 u
si
ng
 c
om
pu
te
r 
sy
nt
ax
 a
nd
/
or
 fo
rm
ul
ae
 fo
r 
pr
og
ra
m
m
in
g)
’. 
T
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
m
ul
tip
lie
s 
th
e 
tw
o 
re
sp
on
se
s 
to
 p
ro
du
ce
 a
 1
6–
0 
sc
al
e.
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